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The recent history  of traditional  public pension schemes is one of continuous
readjustment of benefit formulas, retirement  ages and other parameters.  This paper
reviews the  basic relationships  that  determine  the  fiscal sustainability of public
pension schemes, the challenges of maturation  and aging populations when schemes
are finance on a pay-as-you-go  basis and the options available to policymakers short
of systemic reform.
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31.  Introduction
Public pension  schemes  in many countries  are predominantly  of a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG)  type, particularly in advanced  and transition economies.  This paper reviews
the types of stresses  that PAYG systems  can experience  and discusses  a range  of policy
options to  preserve the  financial stability of  public PAYG  systems. Section 1
introduces  the basic policy levers of a stylized  PAYG system.  Section  2 discusses  the
key short- and long-run  financial  challenges  faced  by PAYG systems.  Section  3 covers
parametric adjustments in the  basic PAYG policy levers as well as administrative
reforms. Section 4  describes broader reform strategies for  maintaining financial
equilibrium  in a PAYG system  including  the option of partial funding.
2.  Policy levers in PAYG systems
The main parameters affecting the financial condition of a stylized PAYG
system  can be brought out by considering  the system's  basic  budget  constraint:
(1)  N(VW) = M(3W),
where N denotes  the number of contributors to the system,  V is the effective  pension
contribution rate, W denotes average  gross  earnings  subject  to contributions,  M is the
number of pensioners,  and 3 denotes  the effective  pension  replacement  rate. 2 Equation
(1)  says  that revenue  and expenditure  of a PAYG system  have  to match  in each  period. 3
Accordingly,  the equilibrium  contribution rate of a PAYG system  is defined  as:
(2)  V = 3(M/N),
where (M/N) is the pension system dependency ratio. Two extensions  of the basic
budget  constraint (2) are useful  for the following  discussion  of PAYG reform  options.
Firstly, to highlight the distinct implications  of population aging and labor market
2 If pensions are indexed to consumer prices (CPI), the pension replacement rate of individual
pensioners may, however, vary over the retirement period.
PAYG systems may, however, also maintain a fluctuation reserve.
4developments on PAYG finances, assume that the number of contributors  amounts to
a proportion  ( of the number  of persons of working  age (N*) and, similarly, assume
that the number of pensioners corresponds to a proportion  * of the number of elderly
persons (M'>).  Second, to allow for the financing of pensions through  budget transfers,
assume that a proportion  S of expenditure on pensions is financed by budget transfers.
Under  these assumptions,  the  effective equilibrium  contribution  rate  of  a  PAYG
system can be written  as:
(3)  V  = 3(1-9)(*/((M*/N*),
where (M'/N*)  is the elderly dependency ratio.
The basic policy  levers or  parameters in the  stylized PAYG pension system
represented by (3) are the effective contribution  rate (V), the budget transfer rate (5),
and the pension replacement rate (3).  In addition, policies that  have an impact on the
two  pension  system  coverage  ratios  (*  and  (),  such  as  labor  market  policies,
immigration  policies,  and  retirement  age  regulations  can  also  affect  financial
conditions.  Finally,  the  finances  of  a  PAYG  pension  system  can be  importantly
influenced  by  demographic  trends,  as  indicated  by  the  presence  of  the  elderly
dependency ratio (M*/N*) in equation (3).
The design and parameters of actual PAYG systems vary substantially across
countries. 4 It is nevertheless useful to  group public PAYG  systems under  the three
broad headings "large," "medium," and "small," according to their role and size in the
overall pension system's multi-pillar structure. First, large-sized  public PAYG pension
pillars  are  mandatory  schemes  with  broad  coverage  and  relatively  high  pension
replacement rates. Large-sized PAYG schemes usually dominate a country's retirement
income provision, leaving relatively minor roles to private pension arrangements. The
4 The annual  publication  Social  Security  Programs  Throughout  the World  published  by the U.S.
Social Security Administration  provides useful information on the parameters  of the main
public pension systems in  most  countries; it  is  also available on  the  internet  ander
http://www.ssa.gov.
5PAYG schemes in  many  European  countries  as well as most transition  economies
would fall under this heading. PAYG schemes in developing countries, while mostly
restricted to public sector employees, often mimic the other key features of large-sized
PAYG systems. Second, medium-sized mandatory PAYG schemes with wide coverage
but  pension  benefits that  promise  an  average wage earner  a pension  of, say, only
around 40 percent of average wages. Medium-sized PAYG schemes provide significant
scope for  private  pension  arrangements.  The PAYG  schemes in most  Anglo-Saxon
countries, but  also in continental  European  countries including the Netherlands  and
Switzerland  fall under  this heading. The third  grouping is comprised by small-sized
PAYG schemes, which  are often financed exclusively through  budget transfers, and
designed to  provide  poverty  relief  to  persons  not  adequately covered by  private
pension schemes. The public pension schemes in Australia and Chile would fall under
this category.
3.  Challenges  to public PAYG systems
For  a given setting  of the  basic PAYG  policy parameters, pressures on  the
finances of  a PAYG  scheme can originate  from  adverse developments in  the  two
pension coverage ratios or  the elderly  dependency ratio. At  the same time,  a given
setting of the basic PAYG  policy parameters may itself be the source of endogenous
changes in the pension coverage ratios.
In the initial stage after the establishment of a medium- to  large-sized PAYG
system, the proportion  of contributors  in the working-age population  (0 is typically
large, while the proportion  of pensioners in the elderly population  (*) is typically low.
This  enables  relatively  high  pension  replacement  rates  (3) to  be  paid  without  a
concurrent  need to levy high pension contribution  rates (V). However, as the PAYG
system  matures,  the  dependency  ratio  (*/0  will  typically  rise  rapidly  and,  with
unchanged replacement rates, contribution  rates (and/or  budget transfers) need to be
adjusted upwards. Such adjustments have been typical for the medium- to  large-sized
PAYG systems in advanced economies since the 1950s.  However, in the particular case
6of the transition economies,  initial contribution rates and/or transfer rates  were often
set at high levels,  as these countries rely almost  exclusively  (as a legacy  of the planned
economy)  on large-sized  PAYG  systems  for retirement  income  provision. 5
As PAYG schemes  mature, several forces can put pressures  on the financial
position. First, by increasing  the ratio (*/O, high contribution/transfer  rates recuired
to finance  large-sized  PAYG systems  may imply a high distorting  tax burden on labor.
This  will tend  to  erode  the  formal economy's employment opportunities and
incentives,  in particular for low-skilled/low-paid  labor. Second,  in response  to acverse
macroeconomic shocks and increased unemployment, there  is often a  (political)
temptation  to use the public  pension  system  as a safety valve  for reducing  labor market
pressures  from elderly workers by encouraging  their earlier retirement.  And third, lax
administrative controls/incentives can lead to  increased rates of early retirement
and/or disability  schemes.  Thus, increasing  contribution/transfer  rates in response  to
increases  in the PAYG system's  coverage  ratio can lead to a vicious  circle of falling
employment, and rising pension expenditure.  If pensions  are indexed  to average  wage
developments,  the  "screening out"  of low-skilled/low-paid  workers reinforces this
vicious circle by  increasing average labor productivity and  wage growth in  the
economy.
Much  attention  has  recently  focussed on  the  financial implications of
population aging, reflected  in projected rapid increases  in elderly dependency  ratios. 6
Population aging is generally a  slow, steady, and  relatively predictable process,'
providing  policy makers with ample time and forewarning  to prepare and put policy
responses  into place.
See de Castello-Branco (1998).
6  The  World  Bank  publication  World  Population  Projections  provides  data  on  long-run
demographic projections.  See also the comprehensive data appendix in the World Bank report
Averting  the OldAge  Crisis, Oxford University Press (Oxford: 1994).
7  The  projection  of  immigration  flows,  particularly  for  small  countries,  can,  however,
introduce  considerable  uncertainty  in population  projections.
7Finally,  PAYG  pension  systems  may  also  need  to  be  adjusted  to  changing
economic  and  social  environments.  For  example,  the  large-sized  PAYG  systems  in
Western  Europe  were  established  during  the  1950s and  1960s based on  the  assumptions
that  jobs  would  usually  be  full-time  and  that  labor  market  attachment  of  workers
would  be  relatively  steady.  However,  deindustrialization,  skill-biased  technological
progress,  and  rising  labor  force  participation  rates  of women  increasingly  undermine
these  assumptions,  leaving  an  increasing  share  of  the  labor  force  without  adequate
benefit  prospects.
4.  Parametric  reform  options
Several  options  are available  for  alleviating  the  financial  strains  that  a PAYG
system  may  be  experiencing.  Different  countries  have  resorted  to  different
combinations  of  these  options  at  various  stages  in  the  evolution  of  their  PAYG
systems.8 If possible,  the  source  of the  financial  pressure  should  be directly  addressed,
but  less  direct  alternatives  may  be  necessary  in  the  face  of  persistent,  structural,
tendencies  or strong  political  resistance. Moreover,  efficiency  considerations  often  have
to be balanced against equity  concerns.9
Adjusting  the  contribution  rate:  This  adjustment  is  most  often  considered
first, especially  in the initial  stages of the  maturing  of a PAYG  scheme.  However,  there
are well known  limits to this  option  set by  considerations  of equity  and efficiency.  The
payroll  tax  is regressive,  especially  when  it  is levied  at  flat  rates  and  there  are  upper
ceilings  on  taxable  earnings.  More  generally,  resistance  is likely  to  be encountered  in
raising  social security  contribution  rates  that  fall  disproportionately  on  the  low-  and
moderate-income  families.  Resistance  is  also  likely  to  be  met  from  higher-income
s  A  collection  of papers  on  pension  reform  options  and  efforts  in  the  countries  of  the
European Union is provided in European  Economy,  1997, No. 4, The Welfare State in Europe:
Challenges and Reforms. For a global review of recent changes to public schemes, see Schwarz
and Demirguc-Kunt (1999).
9 The impact  of several parametric  reform  options  on  the  long-run  financial conditions  of
PAYG systems in industrial countries is illustrated in the Annex.
8groups, who  may view any  attempt  at  raising their  contribution  rates as  not
commensurate  with the benefits that they anticipate.  As regards efficiency,  increasing
already  high contribution rates has been  widely associated  with reducing  employment,
especially  of workers with relatively  elastic labor supply elasticities,  typically in low
paying jobs. Nonetheless,  at times raising  the contribution rate may be a reasonable
compromise  as part of a package  of parametric  reform measures.
Adjusting the budget transfer rate: Increasing  transfers from the budget  has
merit if the financial  strain on the  system is regarded as temporary and there are
serious political costs to  adjusting the  other  system parameters. An  additional
argument  for relying  on increased  budget  transfers  is that they could be used  to pay for
the  cost of redistribution of  benefits between participants from different income
classes,  thereby facilitating  a closer linkage  between an individual's contributions  and
future pension  benefits.  The strengthening  of such a link could help to reduce labor
market distortions that are associated  with high social security taxes, although this
benefit must be weighed  against  the potential  distortions arising  from the financing  of
additional  budget  transfers.
Adjusting the replacement rate: Faced  with difficulties  in raising  contribution
rates  on workers  or increasing  budget  transfers,  a basic  option on the spending  side of a
PAYG system would be to reduce the average  replacement  rate. This can be effected
through reductions  of accrual  factors; lengthening  of  assessment  periods;  elimination
of special  pension  privileges  that assure  high replacement  rates  for selected  pensioners;
introducing  actuarially  fair adjustments  due to early/late retirement;  the incorporation
of demographic factors in  the  benefit formula such  as  negative effect of  rising
dependency  ratios, and changes  in indexation. To overcome likely resistance  t:  the
downward restructuring  of the replacement  rate, emphasis  is often placed on those of
the preceding  measures  that work their way over time, for example,  shifting  indexation
from wages,  which may be growing more rapidly than the CPI, to the CPI. Since  it
preserves  the real value of benefits, this may prove more acceptable  than directly
reducing accrual  factors, even though the effect over time  is similar. Frequently, a
9political  compromise  is  struck  by  applying  the  measures  to  reduce  the  average,
effective,  replacement  rate  of  "new"  pensioners,  and  grandfathering  existing
pensioners,  or those  shortly  to  join their  ranks.
Adjusting  the  pension  coverage  ratio:  Perhaps,  the  most  frequently
considered  option  is to  reduce  the  stock  of  pensioners  by  both  delaying  the  age at
which  a  worker  becomes  eligible  for  a  pension  and  by  lengthening  the  assessment
period  for  pension  eligibility.'"  This  has  been  undertaken  by  several  countries,  most
notably  the  United  States,  which  will  gradually  extend  the  normal  retirement  age at
which  a full pension  is received  for  both  men  and  women  to  67 years.  There  may  also
be  scope  for  equalizing  the  retirement  ages  of  women,  which  are  often  set  lower
despite  greater  longevity,  with  those  of men.  A  gradual  phasing-in  of reforms  would
clearly  be  necessary,  in  order  to  limit  the  perceived  unfairness  to  workers  close  to
retirement,  who  would  have  only  limited  opportunity  to  make  the  requisite  financial
adjustment  in their  consumption  and savings behavior.  The  higher  proportional  cost of
such  reforms  to  women  should  also  be  noted  if  there  is  need  for  equalization  of
retirement  ages.
Another  option  would  be to  increase  labor  force participation,  in  particular  of
women.  This,  however,  may  be less amenable  to  direct  influence.  In  addition,  it  may
take  considerable  time  before  incentive  measures  such as lowering  the  burden  of social
security  taxes  on  workers  and  their  employers  or  the  public  provision  of child  care
increase  labor  force participation.
Administrative  reform  options:  How  a PAYG  scheme  is managed  can play  a
significant  role  in its  successful financial  operation.  An  important  feature  of a PAYG
scheme  is its usually  low  administrative  cost in comparison  to private  pension  systems,
which  is generally  realized  by industrial  economies.  However,  the  transition  countries
in  particular  have  been  experiencing  difficulties  in  effectively  administering  their
ID  To  be effective, such a policy would need to  be combined with additional  disincentives to
limit early retirement,  e.g. through a reduction in accrual factors in the case of early retirement
(reflecting the actuarially higher costs of a longer time span for receiving pensions).
10pension  systems. To  a  considerable extent  this  is  attributable to  the  restructuring
process  involving  the  replacement  of a  relatively  few collection  and  disbursement
points  with  a larger array as a consequence of decentralization. The resulting greater
independence of employers from the state and the abandonment of traditional  ways of
collecting contributions  in favor of self-assessments  and declarations has, in a context of
frequent  liquidity shortages, led to shortfalls in collections. Further  sustained reforms
of the administrative setup are needed to ensure adequate compliance. This source of
stress on the financial performance of the PAYG scheme is frequently compounded by
excessive payments  of  benefits. Reforms  of an  administrative nature  are needed to
promote  more  effective control  on  benefit  payouts  involving,  among  others,  the
weeding out of  "ghost" pensioners.
A problem frequently encountered, especially with mature systems, is the easier
access to eligibility which contributes to  a build up in financial pressure. An example
would be the relative ease with which disability pensions may be obtained. To preserve
the  financial integrity  of the  PAYG  scheme, procedures need to  be  instituted  and
incentives provided for the exercise of greater restraint on the granting of eligibility.
Aside  from  improving  the  administration  of  individual  contributions  and
benefit  payments, it is also important  to  ensure that  the overall management  of the
system  is  adequate. This  is  best  achieved if  the  system  is given a  high  degree  of
independence, under  suitable safeguards, from  political interference. In this  context,
there is considerable value in instituting a procedure of publishing periodic long-term
actuarial  reports  prepared by  independent institutions  as this  could temper  political
propensities to abuse the public pension system."
"  See, for example, the regular actuary reports published  by the Government Actuary's
Department  in the United Kingdom  and the Board  of Trustees  in the United States.
115.  Broader PAYG reform strategies
Besides parametric  adjustments  and  administrative  reforms,  there  may  be a need
to  reconsider  a  broader  strategy  that  would  allow  PAYG  schemes  to  adjust  and
respond  to  a changing  environment.  Exclusive  reliance  on  discretionary  year-on-year
adjustments  of  parameters  would  be  indicative  of  a  "muddling  through"  approach,
with  decisions  on  adjustments  made  only  when  the  source  and  size  of  financial
pressures  become  clear. While  a year-by-year  discretionary  approach  may  be justifiable
in  situations  of significant  uncertainty,  it  can  itself  be  a  source  of  uncertainty  if  the
adjustments  are politically  contentious  and  specific adjustment  measures  are difficult  to
predict.
A  politically  more  assured  approach  would  be  to  set  long-term  rules  for  the
adjustment  of  PAYG  parameters,  which  lead  to  automatic  adjustments  as financial
pressures  arise.  A  case  in  point  would  be  the  practice  in  Germany  of  automatically
indexing  benefits  to  the  growth  rate  of  net  wages,  determined  as gross  wages  less
payroll  and  income  taxes.  This  has  the  advantage  of  taking  some  account  of
demographic  and coverage changes  by automatically  lowering  the  replacement  rate and
the  need  for  budget  transfers  when  the  contribution  rate  rises.  Such  an approach  can
also be justified  on equity  grounds:  if workers  have  to  suffer a higher  contribution  rate
to  pay  for  current  pension  benefits,  the  latter  should  be  adjusted  downward  so  that
pensioners  share in the  burden.
A third  approach,  which  attempts  to tackle  the  issue of intergenerational  equity
head-on,  is to put  in place a "sustainable"  contribution  rate. Here,  a contribution  rate is
selected  that  is a constant  proportion  of pensionable  income  for  all generations  so that
there  is no  perception  of unfairness.  Determining  the  appropriate  level at which  to  set
the  sustainable  contribution  rate  can be  a  difficult  exercise  and  requires  considerable
judgement  and foresight  regarding  the  likely  contingencies  that  will  generate  financial
pressures.  This  approach  was  attempted,  with  a  measure  of  success,  by  the  United
States in  1983. However,  subsequent  experience  showed  that  the  rate should  have been
set  higher  so  as  to  better  cope  with  long-term  funding  requirements.  Owing  to
12uncertainties  about  the  timing  and  extent  of  future  demographic  changes  and  other
contingencies  likely  to  adversely  affect the  PAYG  system,  a conservative  policy  would
be to  err,  if err  one  must,  on the  high side in  setting  payroll  tax  rates.'2 The  essence of
the  sustainable-rate  approach  is  to  build  up  a  reserve  fund  during  the  initial  years,
when  the  flow of contributions  exceeds benefits  paid  out.  This  fund can then  be drawn
down  as the  population  ages, without  the  need  for  unsustainable  increases  in  payroll
tax or contribution  rates.
However,  and  leaving  aside  the  issue  of  intergenerational  equity,  the  reserve
fund  approach  is not  without  controversy.  Issues  arise  regarding  the  economic  and
financial  returns  to pre-funding  and  implications  with  regard to  the  general tax burden
over  time.  Of  particular  interest  is how  the  fund  is organized  and  administered  which
can  affect  the  success  with  which  financial  pressures  in  the  PAYG  system  are
contained."3 Suppose  that,  as  in  many  countries,  the  fund  is  required  to  invest  in
government  securities.  Often  such  financing  induces  a bigger nonpension-related  fiscal
deficit, indicating  that  the  general  level of taxes  is low  but  offset  by the  higher  PAYG
contribution  rates.  It could then  be argued  that  keeping  contribution  rates  at the  lower
equilibrium  levels would  have been  preferable  as this  would  have  forced an increase  in
general  taxes.  Notice  further  that  in  a later  period,  when  as a  consequence  of aging,
benefits  paid  out  exceed  contributions,  and  the  pension  fund  is  being  depleted,  an
increase  in  general  taxes  or  cutbacks  in  expenditure  will  be  needed  to  meet  the
maturing  obligations.  Rather  than  rely  on  higher  taxes,  the  higher  pension  payments
could equally  well  have  been achieved  by relying  on  a higher  equilibrium  contribution
rate. Thus,  what  difference  has accumulating  reserves  under  the  pension  fund  made,  if
the  future  contributing  generation  is subject  to  a higher  fiscal  burden,  whether  in  the
form  of  taxes  or  a  higher  equilibrium  contribution  rate?  Clearly,  the  case  for  a
12 Estimates of sustainable contribution  rates for the major industrial countries and Sweden are
presented in Chand and Jaeger (1996). See  also the Annex to this paper.
13  See for example, Iglesias  and Palacios (2000).
13sustainable contribution  rate  is strengthened  if the  government  does not  engage in
offsetting fiscal behavior.
Suppose, however, the fiscal operations of government are not  influenced by
movements  in  the pension  fund,  for example, if the government  is pursuing a firm
fiscal target (excluding social security). It may now be contended that in a period when
the  pension  fund  is  being  drawn  down,  the  situation  has  become  potentially
inflationary  and that  this  is also taxing. However,  the  inflationary  effects need not
occur as long as monetary policy is not accommodative. The sale of pension fund assets
would  be  absorbed in  private  portfolios, involving an exchange of liquidity for the
assets. Depending on the state of asset demands, asset prices will be depressed (interest
rates  raised) to  the  point  where  the  private  sector  lowers  its  consumption  to
accommodate the higher demands of the pensioners. No  doubt  higher interest rates
will add to the debt service charges of government and, assuming it maintains its fiscal
target,  force it to  undertake  some fiscal adjustment. The outcome  would then  be a
combination  of  fiscal measures and  additional  private  saving that  would  ensure  a
noninflationary  outcome.  The  argument  has  so  far  implicitly  assumed a  closed
economy, but  assuming an open economy could reduce the burden of adjustment on
residents. Even if the pension fund had only invested in domestic government assets, as
long as financial markets are integrated across borders, a drawdown of such assets, by
putting upward pressure on interest rates, would lead to an influx of foreign financing.
As  a consequence, domestic  demands need not  decline to  accommodate the growing
demands of pensioners, which would, of course, result in a bigger deficit on the current
account of the balance of payments.
It  might also be noted that  during the period when  the reserve fund is being
built  up and the proceeds not  being siphoned away by a bigger fiscal deficit, there is
scope for  an increase in  overall saving. This  will, of course, depend on the private
sector not  now  engaging in countervailing behavior, which could occur if they view
the pension fund reserves as a substitute for their  own saving. Clearly, if the  capital
stock  and output  is higher than  it would otherwise have been, it becomes easier for
14succeeding generations to  meet the  growing consumption demands of  an  aging
population. However, if the  sustainable  contribution rate  results in  an offsetting
decline in  savings of current generations, there would appear to  be no  difference
between this approach and that of lowering contribution rates to  their equilibrium
levels  under the standard PAYG and raising  them subsequently  when the need arises.
Nonetheless,  even if this concern and the preceding  ones  about the effectiveness  of the
sustainable  rate approach  are valid, the latter approach  may still be preferable.  This is
because  it obviates  the need for politically  difficult  adjustments  in contribution rates,
while assuring  a more equitable  distributing  of the pension  burden over time.
Issues  may also be raised concerning  the placement  and administration of the
social security funds. On  the  face of  it,  replacing the  customary investment in
government securities  with private equities, on which higher returns are generally
obtained, should help reduce  the burden on the contributing  generation.  However, it
may be contended  that the latter reduction is spurious.  The argument  is that a shift in
pension fund portfolios in favor of private equities  will affect  market prices, reducing
yields on equity but raising  bond interest rates. The latter implies higher debt service
charges which would necessitate  tax increases  to  keep the fiscal deficit unchanged,
assuming  that government  maintains  a firm fiscal  target.  Indeed,  the outcome  could be
one where the private sector suffers  relative  to the public sector:  the increased  flow of
debt service  receipts  is offset  by higher taxes,  while  equity  incomes  would be lower. As
a result the overall rate of return to  private saving declines,  with obvious adverse
effects.  However, it  could also be argued  that such a portfolio shift, by lowering the
cost of capital, stimulates  capital accumulation  and higher future output levels This
should make the  pension-related  burden  easier to  bear. The  accumulation of a
publicly-managed  pension fund, in  particular in the case of  a  large-sized  PAYG
system,  may also raise  difficult issues  regarding  the role of pension fund managers  in
corporate governance.
156.  Conclusions
This paper has addressed issues concerning the financial pressures that a PAYG
scheme may be subjected to and the measures that could be taken to alleviate them. A
distinction  was drawn  between adjustments involving key parameters of the PAYG
scheme  and  more  fundamental  strategic  reform  involving  the  replacement  of
fluctuating,  equilibrium,  contribution  rates  with  a  constant  sustainable  rate.  The
Annex reports the results of simulations that  show the potential scope of reforms for
preserving  PAYG  systems  among  the  leading  industrial  countries.  Although  in
principle recourse to such reforms should be adequate for the rehabilitation of a PAYG
system, in  practice this  has not  been widely borne  out.  It would be  interesting to
review  how  different  countries  have coped  with  the  financial pressures that  their
PAYG systems may have been experiencing or that they are anticipated to experience.
However,  while such an  assessment is beyond  the  scope of this  paper  some  broad
generalizations may be noted.
Countries  that have large-sized PAYG systems that  are poorly  organized and
administered have the  greatest difficulty in  rehabilitating such systems. This  would
appear  to  be  the  case with  most  countries  in  Latin  America  and  now  with  the
transition  economies. The  response among the Latin American countries,  stimulated
no doubt  by the  successful experience of Chile, was to  shift to  defined-contribution
schemes that to varying degrees are private-based. In most cases the large-sized PAYG
schemes are downgraded to  small-sized schemes that  provide essential poverty  relief.
However,  this  need not  be the outcome with  the  much better  administered  PAYG
schemes of Western Europe for whom the kind of adjustments indicated in the Annex
may be adequate, although painful. At the same time, medium-sized PAYG systems of
the type to be found in most Anglo-Saxon countries and also in the Netherlands  and
Switzerland are more readily reformed than large-sized  PAYG systems.
16Annex
This  annex illustrates various  parametric  reforms  to  make  a  PAYG  system
more sustainable drawing on data for the major industrial countries."  A simple way to
gauge the scale of long-run  adjustment needed to  assure the  financial viability  of a
pension plan is to calculate the contribution  gap. This gap is the difference between a
constant sustainable contribution  rate consistent with no build up of pension debt and
the  average contribution  rate  likely to  prevail under  unchanged  PAYG  parameters
(Table  1).  For  example,  for  Germany's  pension  system,  the  average  unchanged
contribution  rate  would  amount  to  10.3  percent  of  GDP  while  a  sustainable
contribution  rate  of  13.7 percent  of  GDP  would  be  required  during  the  period
1995-2050, indicating a  contribution  gap of  3.4 percent  of  GDP.'5 All  the  major
industrial countries face contribution  gaps over the period  1995-2050,  although some
countries are relatively well off, while other  countries  appear to  face more  difficult
situations.
The need for prompt  attention to the long-run financing problems of a PAYG
system is illustrated by  calculations indicating the  effect on  the contribution  gap of
postponing  reforms. For the average major industrial country,  a delay of ten years in
addressing the pension fund imbalance would permanently  increase the contribution
that will be needed by 0.7 percent of GDP; a delay by 30 years would increase the gap
by  4.5 percent  of  GDP.  Thus,  the  earlier the  adjustment  measures are taken,  the
smaller the adjustments that are needed in the long run.
The table  also illustrates the  fiscal impact of various  parametric  changes in
pension plan parameters: a 5 percentage point  reduction in the replacement rate for all
t  Additional  evidence  on the impact  of parametric  pension reforms for 20 OECD countries is
provided  by Roseveare  (1996).
'5  These calculations  were based on public pension plan parameters  as of end-1994.  In the
meantime,  several  countries  included  in Table I have undertaken parametric reforms of their
pension systems, and projections based on more recent information may indicate more
favorable  long-term  financial  outlooks for these pension  systems.
17pensioners; a cutback of the present indexation arrangements of pension benefits to 80
percent  of  the  CPI  inflation  rate;  and  a  uniform  and  immediate  increase  in  the
retirement  age to  67. For  many of the countries, increasing the retirement  age has a
marked  effect on  the  size of the  contribution  gap.  In  countries  like  France,  and
especially Italy,  raising the  retirement  age to  67 would  practically close the  large
contribution gaps.
18Annex  Table. Selected Industrial Countries:  Sustainable Contribution  Rates and Contribution  Gaps, 1995-2050
(In percent of GDP)
Projected  Reduction  in
Average  Sustainable  Reforms  Reforms  Replacement
Contribution  Contribution  rate  by
Rate  Rate  Contribution  Pobtpoloned  Pobtpo3oned  5  percentage  80  percent  Retirement
1995-2050  1995-2050  1/  Gap 2/  by 10  by 30  points  indexation  at age  67
years  years
Major  industrial  countries  6.5  8.3  1.8  0.7  4.5  -1.1  -0.
United  States  4.7  5.5  0.8  0.2  1.5  -1.2  -@
Japan  3.9  7.2  3.3  1.4  8.9  -0.7  -
Germany  10.3  13.7  3.4  1.3  9.5  -1.4  -25
France  12.1  15.4  3.3  1.3  7.9  -1.3  -13
Italy  16.0  18.5  2.5  1.1  6.5  -0.7  _-
United  Kingdom  4.2  4.3  0.1  0.1  0.3  -0.8  -C  5
Canada  3.8  5.8  2.0  0.5  3.4  -1.2  -05
4  0
Source:  This  table  is  based  on Chand  and  Jaeger  (1996).
1/ The sustainable  contribution  rate  is defined  as the  constant  contribution  rate  over 1995-2050  that equalizes  the net asset  position  in 2050  with the
initial  net  asset  position  in 1995.
2/ Defined  as  the  difference  between  the  sustainable  contribution  rate  and  projected  overall  contribution  rate.References
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